David Pettigrew: The Betrayal of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina

“The Betrayal of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina” “Izdaja ljudskih prava i tranzicijska pravda u Bosni i Hercegovini”

KRUG 99, Sarajevo, December 1, 2019

David Pettigrew, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy and Holocaust and Genocide Studies Southern Connecticut State University Member of the Steering Committee, Yale Genocide Studies Program

I

 The phrase “Transitional Justice” refers to the transition that must occur for a society that suffered genocide, to a civil society in which the survivors’ dignity and human rights are respected and supported, including, for example, the right to be protected from further harm, to institutional reform and the restoration of the rule of law, to the truth, to reparations, and to memorialization. This transition and these rights can be pursued by judicial and non-judicial means in an effort to repair the society and move towards justice and reconciliation.

1 But, Mr. Milorad Dodik, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,2 has betrayed any hope of human rights and transitional justice for Bosnia through Islamophobic hate speech, hostile statements in opposition to the sovereignty of Bosnia and against national institutions, denial of the Srebrenica genocide, praise for convicted war criminals, and the suppression of memorials for the victims of genocide and other war crimes. When Bosnia’s SDA party (The Party of Democratic Action) made a constructive proposal for constitutional reform that would reunify Bosnia as a republic and would determine nationality at least primarily on the basis of citizenship rather than ethnicity,3 President Dodik dismissed the proposal as an essentially Islamic plot.

While the SDA proposal was an important vision for transitional justice for a civil society recovering from genocide, Mr. Dodik’s inflammatory reaction intended nothing less than Islamophobic fear-mongering as he predicted that, if the resolution were to come to pass, Bosnia would risk falling under the rule of Sharia law.4 Perhaps even more provocative was his equation of Bosnian Muslims with radical Islamic fighters in Syria, when he stated that: “… a good number of citizens were radicalized and participated in the Syrian war,” and that “the Islamic State in Syria acted on the basis of Alija Izetbegovic’s Islamic Declaration.”5 In a television interview on November 24, 2019, President Dodik continued such Islamophobic references, alluding to plan by the international community and the “Muslims” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to suppress the Serbs and make the country for Muslims, and stated, moreover that Serbs and Croats were being subjected to the will of “Muslim Sarajevo.” In the interview he once again raised a concern about radicalized Muslim clergy and terrorist attacks.6 This rhetoric is indeed unconscionable, and it should be unacceptable to the international community, to the High Representative and to the Peace Implementation Council charged with overseeing the peace in Bosnia. But Mr. Dodik’s rhetoric is not far removed from the recent statement by Emmanuel Macron who said (on the topic of limiting access to the EU): “If you’re concerned about this region, the first question is neither North Macedonia nor Albania, it’s Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time-bomb that’s ticking right next to Croatia, and which faces the problem of returning jihadists.”7 There is a deeply troubling Islamophobia implicit in that statement as well, one that echoes what Taylor Branch reported in his book The Clinton Tapes: “U.S. Allies in Europe blocked proposals to adjust or remove the embargo” (the arms embargo) since they felt that “an independent Bosnia would be ‘unnatural’ as the only Muslim nation in Europe.”8 According to Branch, President Clinton reported that “President François Mitterand of France had been especially blunt in saying that Bosnia did not belong, and that British officials also spoke of a painful but realistic restoration of Christian Europe.”9 Hence Macron’s comment follows in that unseemly tradition. But Mr. Dodik’s statements and innuendos are even more problematic, precisely because of his leadership position and of the impact he therefore has on national and regional stability as well as on survivors of the genocide who are psychologically vulnerable. His statements are also reminiscent of the time when he claimed that Muslims were re-occupying the Podrinje, which was blatantly dehumanizing hate speech.10 President Dodik was targeting those who were returning to the homes from which they were forcibly expelled by atrocities that have been judged to be genocide. It is clear that human rights and the possibility of transitional justice are under attack. Transitional justice would require that survivors could expect that they would be treated with dignity, and that leaders would respect their human rights, but with Mr. Dodik’s inflammatory rhetoric that rises to the level of hate speech, this is not the case.11 

II

 Mr. Dodik’s attack on the SDA’s proposal for national unification is only the latest expression of his opposition to any idea of national unity, and of his constant signaling of his intention to secede from Bosnia and merge with Serbia.  In his November 2019 report to the UN Security Council, the High Representative expressed deep concern about “frequent destabilizing rhetoric …including statements continually made by Mr. Dodik predicting the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and advocating for the secession of the Republika Srpska, and unification with Serbia.”12 Mr. Dodik has maligned the country, moreover, by stating that Bosnia was a “disfigured state that should never have survived” beyond 1996.13 The leadership of Republika Srpska has heightened tensions in Bosnia by advancing the goal of a special militarized police force. The police forces (municipal, military, and special units) played a central role in the war crimes that were committed against non-Serbs from 1992 to 1995.

Indictments and Judgments routinely referred to the Army units and police forces of Republika Srpska, which came under a unified command.14 Hence, the new militarized police unit that has been proposed for Republika Srpska is re-traumatizing for the survivors.  

 President Dodik has challenged State level agreements and institutions as he threatened “to torpedo a number of major achieved reforms in the country, including the formation of joint armed forces and a state court and police agency.”15 He insisted that Republika Srpska, would “withdraw from the Armed Forces Agreement,” would “withdraw its consent” from the taxation plan that provides “income for state-level institutions” and would “reject the work of the [state] Court and Prosecutor’s Office as well as the work of the State Investigation and Protection Agency [SIPA]”.16 He claimed that Republika Srpska would call into question “all the other competencies that have been transferred from the two entities in Bosnia to state level over the years.”17 Only days after signing a document intended to advance Bosnia toward membership with NATO, which also allowed for the appointment of Prime Minister Tegeltija and the formation of the government, President Dodik declared Republika Srpska would never join NATO, made extreme nationalist and exclusionary statements about Republlika Srpska, and insisted the Serbs had a special place in their hearts for Russia.18  Further, according to the High Representative’s November 2019 report to the UN Security Council, Mr. Dodik is rejecting all laws and decisions enacted “under pressure of the High Representative” as “invalid,” and Mr. Dodik had “announced a session of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska for early November to pursue this determination of the work of the High Representative.”19 At the announced session, in fact, the Bosnian Serb Assembly “adopted principles on Tuesday, November 12, declaring the entity’s right to referenda on ‘self determination’ and Bosnian membership of NATO.”  The Assembly of Republika Srpska called for the Office of the High Representative “to be abolished.” President Dodik asserted that Republika Srpska would not “give up on its autonomy and its statehood.”20 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) quickly asserted that Republika Srpska cannot be considered sovereign in any sense of the word and that it has no right to secede.21 However, Mr. Dodik was particularly insubordinate in relation to the rule of law represented by the Dayton Peace Accords and by the position and role of the High Representative when, in September 2019, he asserted that the High Representative “should disappear,” insisting moreover “that the country’s top international official is ‘unnecessary,’ and that his opinion is not important.”22 President Dodik’s destabilizing rhetoric serves only to undermine the kind of State-level institutional reform that is imperative for transitional justice. Rather than building trust he generates cynicism. Survivors see little hope for justice. 

III

 When the High Representative spoke, on July 11, 2019, on the occasion of the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, of a long overdue initiative to pass a national law against genocide denial, President Dodik’s immediate response was that the passage of such a law would provide authorization for Republika Srpska to secede.23 This passed as yet another destabilizing threat. But it should not escape our intention that genocide denial implies an even deeper threat to human rights and to transitional justice. According to Gregory Stanton’s paradigm regarding the ten stages of genocide, genocide denial is the 10th stage. For Stanton, “Denial is the final stage that lasts throughout and always follows genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres.”24 Under the authority of Milorad Dodik, as former President of Republika Srpska, and as the current Serb member of the Presidency, over the course of the past decade, his own consistent denial of genocide has encouraged the growth of a culture of the celebration of the genocide, including the glorification of war criminals, with, for example, a plaque commemorating Radovan Karadžić on a dormitory in Pale, and a plaque honoring Ratko Mladić on Vraca Hill. In addition to the plaques, there has been a proliferation of chants, T-shirts, and posters celebrating the genocide, a cultural phenomenon deemed as “Triumphalism”25 by Hariz Halilovich, an “11th Stage of genocide”: In this stage, perpetrators, their sponsors, and the politics behind genocide do not deny the killings any longer, but rather they glorify them, celebrate their deeds, humiliate the survivors, build monuments to the perpetrators at the sites of the massacres, and create a culture of triumphalism such as has been seen in the parts of Bosnia where Serb militias committed genocide against Bosniaks.26

Sadly, Mr. Dodik’s divisive rhetoric, his public expressions of Islamophobia, his genocide denial, his glorification of convicted war criminals, and his ridicule of the State and of the Office of the High Representative, have indeed fostered a culture of such “Triumphalism,” a culture that involves the kind of dehumanizing hate speech that has been at the cause of genocide in recent history.27 Confronting such genocide denial and triumphalism, the Secretary General of the United Nations has written that “prevention is the first imperative of transitional justice.” In this respect, his report emphasizes that the “root causes of the conflict” must be addressed in the sense that hate speech and genocide denial could trigger a repetition of the atrocities.  The United Nations document on “Basic Principles and Guidelines” for reparations also asserts that there must be a guarantee of the non-repetition of the atrocities.28  The war crimes committed at Srebrenica have been ruled to be genocide by two international judicial institutions. Hence, Mr. Dodik’s statements are a rejection of a number of integral dimensions of transitional justice, including the human right to the truth, and the rule of law. Encouraging triumphalism and flaunting the basic principle that the victim should be guaranteed that the crime should not be repeated, he speaks as though he is above the law and that he, and his followers, can speak an act with impunity. To say that transitional justice is at risk in Bosnia would be an understatement.

IV

Certain human rights violations in Republika Srpska have precisely been intended, by virtue of psychological intimidation, to prevent Bosniaks from returning to the homes from which they were forcibly expelled by atrocities that have been judged to be war crimes. Such actions aimed at preventing freedom of movement within the country would be a human rights violation,29 and actions aimed a preventing refugee return would also be a violation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  A primary example of such a human rights violation in Republika Srpska would be the discriminatory prohibition of memorials for the victims of torture and murder at the sites of Omarska and Trnopolje concentration camps. Survivors are allowed to visit the site of the Omarska camp, located then and now on the grounds of a private mining company, one day each year, on August 6, which is the symbolic date for the closing the camp in 1992, following its discovery by journalists. The survivors and their supporters gather for commemorative speeches, lay flowers at the White House in which prisoners were tortured and killed, and release white balloons to which the names of the victims attached. Survivors, family members, and their supporters at the commemoration, are closely monitored by guards while they are within the camp grounds, which can be re-traumatizing. This prohibition of a memorial for the victims is discriminatory since there are memorials for the perpetrators that have been installed in the area.

For example, a memorial for the perpetrators has been installed at the site of the former Trnopolje concentration camp, where there is no memorial for the victims.30 The Trnopolje community center, which was one of the camp buildings, has been renovated and a memorial to the perpetrators has also been installed within the building.31 Further, in August 2019, it was reported that the mayor of the Prijedor Municipality had signed a contract for a shoe factory to occupy the community center building as well.32 Hence, the Trnopolje camp building has been re-purposed in a way that effectively erases the memory of the concentration camp. Such a glorification of convicted criminals and suppression of the memory of the victims should be unacceptable in a society that respects the rule of law and human rights. But such “triumphalism” continues unabated in Republika Srpska, with, most recently, the unveiling of the bust for Nikola Koljević–who was identified in the Karadžić judgment as part of the Joint Criminal Enterprise and one of the “four core leaders”–in Banja Luka.33 Survivors are essentially surrounded by memorials to the perpetrators while being unable to install memorials to the victims. 

 If we take into account President Dodik’s extreme rhetoric, and his genocide denial, along with the glorification of the convicted war criminals in Republika Srpska, as well as the ICTY’s failure to establish a convincing narrative concerning the genocidal aggression perpetrated against non-Serbs, a failure that is due to short prison sentences, early releases–Goran Jelisić, the self-described “Serb Adolf” may be eligible for release next year34–and the small number of genocide convictions and life sentences, perhaps it is less surprising, but certainly no less revolting, that the Nobel committee awarded the Nobel prize for literature to  Peter Handke. The Nobel Prize, in this case, was a reward for and an endorsement of genocide denial and Serb extremism. With Macron’s statements about Bosnia, and Handke’s Nobel Prize, the stakes for resistance to genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals have never been higher.  The prohibition of memorials for the victims is a violation of the human right to memorialization.35 The prohibition of memorials for the victims is also a violation of the obligation of the State, as part of transitional justice, to preserve the memory of the genocide and other atrocities.36 This and other betrayals of human rights and transitional justice in Republika Srpska must be confronted without delay. 

V

What steps can be taken, then, to pursue human rights and transitional justice in response to Milorad Dodik and his destabilizing rhetoric? In his 56th report to the United Nations Security Council, the High Representative spoke boldly of the “need for State-level legislation addressing the denial of genocide…”37 The High Representative’s goal to facilitate the establishment of a law against the denial of the Srebrenica genocide and other war crimes could indeed be guided by, and be a completion of, the previous decisions by three successive High Representatives, which were made in a coordinated way, over the course of eight years, to establish the SrebrenicaPotočari Memorial and Cemetery.38 The establishment of the memorial cemetery sought to achieve “reconciliation” that would “promote the return of displaced persons and refugees and permanent peace,”39 and more pointedly, “the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons.”40 Moreover, the High Representatives’ decisions from 2000 to 2007, asserted the importance of recognizing “the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of each and every human being.”41 The facilitation of a law against the denial of the Srebrenica genocide and other war crimes, would then, be a fitting completion of the actions taken by the Office of the High Representative over the years in the interest of transitional justice.  This would be an important way to confront the dangers of genocide denial, triumphalism, and the threat of a repetition of the genocide.

 Further, a fundamental precursor to respecting human rights and to achieving transitional justice would be for the leadership and citizens of Republika Srpska to take responsibility for the crimes that were committed in its name and to recognize the suffering of the victims. In the case of Srebrenica, Prijedor, and elsewhere, some victims’ human remains have still not been located or identified, so the installation of a memorial or memorials is profoundly important for the grieving relatives, as it would be the only possible social alternative to a proper burial. In the face of denial and the prohibition of memorials, it is a fundamental tenet of transitional justice that the State has a duty to preserve the memory of the suffering of the victims.42 When I attended the commemoration at Omarska in August I was invited to speak to those gathered. I expressed my solidarity with the survivors and their families, called for the High Representative to go forward with his plan to facilitate the implementation of a national law against the denial of the Srebrenica genocide and other war crimes, and promised that I would continue to advocate for their right to install a memorial in memory of the victims and survivors at Omarska. Today, I continue to speak for a memorial at Omarska and Trnopolje, in Prijedor, and elsewhere, and call upon the High Representative to support the survivors in this undertaking.  But in his November 2019 report to the UN Security Council, the High Representative also spoke of the need for State-level legislation addressing the glorification of “war criminals and other controversial figures by naming public buildings and other spaces after war criminals…”43 The celebration of the acts of the perpetrators legitimizes them and threatens that they will be repeated again. Therefore, the plaque for Radovan Karadžić, on the dormitory in Pale, the statue in Višegrad for “the brave defenders of Republika Srpska,” the statue in Trnopolje for the “Serb fighters who bodies laid the foundation of Republika Srpska,” and finally the plaque honoring Ratko Mladić in Vraca Hill above Sarajevo, should be systematically removed by the relevant authorities. Indeed, the plaque for Mladić above Sarajevo is an insult to more than 11,000 victims of the siege. In memory of the murdered children of Sarajevo, I call upon the relevant authorities to remove the plaque for Ratko Mladić. Only in this way can human rights be respected and transitional justice become possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through these and other initiatives, hope in the future of Bosnia as a unified multicultural nation can be restored.

Endnotes in progress for version presented for KRUG 99, December 1, 2019.

1. “What is Transitional Justice,” The International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ,

https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice. See also, “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,” Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Security Council, 2011, https://documents-dsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement,  and,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Pages/TransitionalJustice.aspx

2. President Dodik is also leader of the SNSD party (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, a Bosnian Serb political party).

3. “Pročitajte kako SDA zamišlja buduće ustrojstvo države: Jedan predsjednik, Vlada Republika BiH…” Klix, 14 September 2019, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/procitajte-kako-sda-zamislja-buduce-ustrojstvo-drzave-jedan-predsjednik-vlada-republike-bih/190914004

4. “Milorad Dodik: Deklaracija SDA je nastavak Islamske deklaracije Alije Izetbegovića. Republika Srpska ima spreman odgovor.” Oslobobođenje, 19 September 2019,

https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/milorad-dodik-deklaracija-sda-je-nastavak-islamske

deklaracije-alije-izetbegovica-republika-srpska-ima-spreman-odgovor-490692. “Following the issuance of the SDA declaration, SNSD leader Dodik and other representatives of the Republika Srpska met with the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, in Belgrade, where Mr. Dodik reportedly warned of conflict and solicited Serbia’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”(a) OHR, 11/05/19 56th report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int/?p=102518.

5. “Dodaje da se dobar dio građana radikalizovao i učestvovao u sirijskom ratu, a kaže i da je Islamska država u Siriji delovala na bazi Islamske deklaracije Alije Izetbegovića.” See “Milorad Dodik: Deklaracija SDA je nastavak Islamske deklaracije Alije Izetbegovića. Republika Srpska ima spreman odgovor.”Oslobođenje, 17 September 2019,

https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/milorad-dodik-deklaracija-sda-je-nastavak-islamske

deklaracije-alije-izetbegovica-republika-srpska-ima-spreman-odgovor-490692. 

6. “Unfinished Business?.” Russia Today, 24 November 2019,

https://www.rt.com/shows/worlds-apart-oksana-boyko/474187-unfinished-business-milorad

dodik/. 

7. Kovacevic, Danijel.”Bosnia Demands Explanation for Macron’s ‘Time-Bomb’ Remark.”  BalkanInsight, 8 November 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/08/bosnia-demands-explanation-for-macrons-time-bomb-remark/. See Macaes, Bruno. “Macron’s Islamophobic Undercurrent,” Politico, 12 Nov. 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-islamophobic-undercurrent-french-vision/. See also, Karcic, Hamza. “Emmanuel Macron’s EU

Veto Set to Leave Balkan Muslims Out.” Daily Sabah Op-Ed, 11 Nov.  2019,

https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/11/11/emmanuel-macrons-eu-veto-set-to-leave-balkan

muslims-out. See Li, Darryl. “Macron’s ‘Time-Bomb’ Remark Betrays Wider Anti-Muslim Prejudice.” BalkanInsight, 12 Nov. 2019,  https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/12/macrons-time-bomb-remark-betrays-wider-anti-muslim-prejudice/?fbclid=IwAR2aDsNRbLBnFLEj0gqVUam4GFkPxWfXxFVPwCQ_42NSm9CMCpo-FXmx-fD4

8. Branch, Taylor. The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History in the White House. London: Simon & Schuster, 2009. 9-10.

9. Ibid. 14

10. Spaic, Igor. “Bosnian Serb President in ‘Hate Speech’ Probe.” BalkanInsight, 18 July 2017,

11. “What is Transitional Justice,” The International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ,

https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.

12. 56th report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR, 11/05/19,  http://www.ohr.int/?p=102518

13. “Bosnian Serb leader: Bosnia is a disfigured state and should never have survived.” N1, 13 Sept. 2019, http://ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a378066/Bosnian-Serb-leader-Bosnia-is-a-disfigured-state-and-should-never-have-survived.html

14. See, for example, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber Judgement, Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-T), §3214, 24 March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. Also see International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber Judgement, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), 2 August 2001, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf.

15. Kovacevic, Danijel. “Dodik Threatens Action Over Bosnian Govt Delays.” 14 August 2019, BalkanInsight, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/14/dodik-threatens-drastic-action-over-bosnian-govt-delays/

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. 

18. “Bosnia to form government, send ‘document’ to NATO – is the crisis ending?,” N1, November 19, 2019, http://ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a392252/Bosnia-to-form-government

send-document-to-NATO-is-the-crisis-ending.html. For the apparent reversal of his agreement, see “Unfinished Business?.” Russia Today, 24 November 2019,

https://www.rt.com/shows/worlds-apart-oksana-boyko/474187-unfinished-business-milorad

dodik/. The inflammatory and divisive rhetoric in this interview came days after Mr. Dodik had signed the Annual National Program (ANP) document, which led to the appointment of Prime Minister Zoran Tegeltija. The ANP was seen by many as the preliminary step toward Bosnia’s membership in NATO. But in the interview President Dodik insists he has no plan to enter NATO and perceives joining the EU and NATO as separate.  At the conclusion of the interview President Dodik explains: (paraphrasing) “We do not wish any harm to Bosniaks but what they need to understand is that BiH is not theirs, its for all of us in this country, and that RS is exclusively ours. When they learn that lesson then we will be able to cooperate.” “Bošnjaci moraju da znaju da BiH nije njihova, a RS je isključivo naša” [Bosniaks must know that Bosnia is not theirs ….and Republika Srpska is exclusively ours].

19. See 56th report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR, 11/05/19,  http://www.ohr.int/?p=102518

20. Kovacevic, Danijel .”Bosnian Serb Lawmakers Claim Right to Self-Determination.” BalkanInsight, 12 November 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/12/bosnian-serb-lawmakers-claim-right-to-self-determination/

21. “Statement of the Ambassadors of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board.” OHR, 13 Nov 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=102595.

22. “Dodik: High Representative Should Disappear.” N1, 5 September 2019. 

http://ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a343249/Dodik-High-representative-should-disappear.html

23. “Opet Dodik: Ako Inzko donese zakon o negiranju genocida, neka računa na referendum.”

https://www.radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/opet-dodik-ako-inzko-donese-zakon-o

negiranju-genocida-neka-racuna-na-referendum/344377

24. See Ten Stages of Genocide by Gregory Stanton, Genocide Watch: The International Alliance to End Genocide, http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html.

(my emphasis)

25. See, e.g., “What Are the Ten Stages of Genocide.” AlJazeera, 11 July 2019,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2019/07/10-stages-genocide-190710112516344.html,

which includes “Triumphalism,” the 11th stage of genocide proposed by Hariz Halilovich.

26. Halilovich, Hariz. “Globalization and Genocide,” in A. Faraymand (ed.) Global Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance (New York: Springer).

27. See, Hadžimušić, Aida. “Folklorno Veličanje: Internet Preplavljen Pjesmana o Genocidu, Genocid u Srebrenici: Zločin Koji Traje.” AlJazeera Balkans, 11 July 2019,

28. “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx.

29. Ibid.

30.  I addressed the discriminatory prohibition of memorials for the victims in my chapter, “The Suppression of Cultural Memory and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory, edited by Jutta Lindert and Armen Marsoobian. Springer International Publishing, 2018. 

31. “Prijedor: U Trnopolju otvorena spomen soba vojnicima VRS-a, bivši logoraši razočarani.” Klix, 22 March 2016,  https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/prijedor-u-trnopolju-otvorena-spomen-soba-vojnicima-vrs-a-bivsi-logorasi-razocarani/160321114.

32. “Travnička fabrika obuće pokreće poslovanje u Prijedoru.” Nezavisne, 15 August 2019,

https://www.nezavisne.com/ekonomija/privreda/Travnicka-fabrika-obuce-pokrece-poslovanje-u

Prijedoru/553612.

33. “U Banjoj Luci otkrivena bista ratnom zločincu Nikoli Koljeviću,” Oslobođenje, 14 Nov. 

2019, https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/foto-u-banjoj-luci-otkrivena-bista-ratnom zlocincu-nikoli-koljevicu-507048. Also see Dragan Bursać, “Mrtve oči 102 ubijena prijedorska djeteta gledaju spomenike svojim ubicama.”AlJazeeraBalkans, 16 November 2019,

http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/mrtve-oci-102-ubijena-prijedorska-djeteta-gledaju-spomenike

svojim-ubicama

34. Milutinovic, Radosa.”UN Court Refuses to Free ‘Serb Adolf’.” BalkanInsight, 14 August 2017, https://balkaninsight.com/2017/08/14/un-court-refuses-to-free-serb-adolf-08-14-2017/.

35. “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx.  See also, “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,” Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Security Council, 2011, https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement. Also see:

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Pages/TransitionalJustice.aspx

36. Ibid.

37. 56th report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR, 11/05/19, http://www.ohr.int/?p=102518

38. The decisions were: Wolfgang Petritsch High Representative, “Decision on the location of a cemetery and a monument for the victims of Srebrenica,” OHR, 25 October 2000,

http://www.ohr.int/?p=67588; Wolfgang Petritsch High Representative, “Decision establishing and registering the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery,” OHR, 10 May 2001, http://www.ohr.int/?p=67761; Paddy Ashdown, High Representative,  “Decision ordering the transfer of ownership of the Battery Factory “AS” a.d -Srebrenica to the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery and establishing an ad hoc Battery Factory “AS” a.d.- Srebrenica compensation Commission,” OHR, 25 March 2003, http://www.ohr.int/?p=65883; Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, High Representative, “Decision Enacting the Law on the center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June 2007, http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715

The enactment of the Law followed the Judgement of the International Court of Justice that genocide had occurred at Srebrenica: “§297. The Court concludes that the acts committed at Srebrenica falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about 13 July 1995.” Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD 01-00-EN.pdf

39. Decision establishing and registering the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery, OHR, 2001, http://www.ohr.int/?p=67761; and “Decision Enacting the Law on the Center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June, 2007

40. “Decision Enacting the Law on the center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June 2007,

http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715

41. “Decision Enacting the Law on the center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June 2007,

http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715

42. “Truth and Memory.” The International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ,

https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory

43. 56th report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on

Bosnia and Herzegovina. OHR, 11/05/19, http://www.ohr.int/?p=102518

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